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AN EMPIRICAL STUDY OF THE ROLE OF THE
WRITTEN DESCRIPTION REQUIREMENT IN
PATENT EXAMINATION
DENNIS CROUCH*

INTRODUCTION
An en banc Federal Circuit recently confirmed that § 112 of the Patent
Act,1 as properly interpreted, includes a written description requirement that
is separate and distinct from the enablement requirement.2 The written description and enablement doctrines both encourage applicants to fully disclose their inventions, but the doctrines respectively focus on proof that the
patentee (1) has possession of the invention;3 and (2) has enabled others to
make and use the invention.4 The en banc-challenger argued instead that
the patent statute spells out a unified requirement of a written description
that enables and that the separate written description requirement should be
eliminated.5
The U.S. Patent & Trademark Office (USPTO) is the executive branch
agency tasked with the responsibility of examining patent applications to
determine whether patent rights should issue.6 Once a patent issues, the
constitutionally guaranteed exclusive rights7 can be enforced in federal
*

Associate Professor of Law, University of Missouri School of Law, crouchdd@missouri.edu. Author of Patent Law Blog (Patently-O), http://www.patentlyo.com (link). I want to thank the Colloquy
editors for their excellent and timely editorial suggestions.
1
35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 1 (2006) (link).
2
Ariad Pharms., Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 598 F.3d 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (link). The Federal Circuit‘s pronouncements on patent law are especially important because that court holds exclusive jurisdiction over all appeals of final decisions for cases that arise under the US patent laws. Holmes Group,
Inc. v. Vornado Air Circulation Sys., Inc., 535 U.S. 826, 82930 (2002) (link).
3
Tronzo v. Biomet, Inc., 156 F.3d 1154, 1158 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (asking whether the application
―reasonably convey[s] to one of skill in the art that the inventor possessed the [claimed] subject matter at
the time the [patent] application was filed‖ (citation omitted)) (link).
4
AK Steel Corp. v. Sollac, 344 F.3d 1234, 1243–44 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (the original specification of a
patent must enable one of skill in the art to make and use the invention) (link).
5
Brief for Plaintiffs-Apellees, Ariad Pharms., Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 598 F.3d 1336 (Fed. Cir. Mar.
22, 2010).
6
See generally JANICE M. MUELLER, PATENT LAW 4558 (3rd ed. 2009) (providing an overview of
the patent examination process).
7
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (giving Congress the power to ―promote the Progress of Science and
useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries‖) (link).
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courts.8 Although the USPTO has no direct role in the infringement dispute
between the patentee Ariad9 and the accused infringer Eli Lilly,10 the government submitted an amicus curiae brief indicating its continued support
for the written description requirement as a tool that the USPTO uses to
eliminate claims during the patent examination process.11 The government
argued in its brief that a separate written description requirement is ―necessary to permit USPTO to perform its basic examination function.‖12 However, when pressed during oral arguments, the government could not point
to any direct evidence supporting its contention.13
This Essay presents the results of a retrospective empirical study of the
role of the written description requirement in patent office examination
practice. It is narrowly focused on rebutting the USPTO‘s claim that the
separate written description requirement serves an important role in the patent prosecution process. To the contrary, my results support the conclusion
that it is indeed ―exceedingly rare that the patent office hangs its case on
written description.‖14
For the study, I analyzed 2,858 Board of Patent Appeals and Interference (BPAI) patent opinions decided between January and June of 2009.
Written description issues were decided in 123 (4.3%) of the decisions in
my sample. Perhaps surprisingly, I found that none of the outcomes of
those decisions would have been impacted by a legal change that entirely
eliminated the written description requirement of § 112, so long as the
USPTO would still be allowed to reject claims based on the addition of
―new matter‖ (perhaps under 35 U.S.C. § 132).15 A rule change that also
8

28 U.S.C. § 1338(a) (2006) (―The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action
arising under any Act of Congress relating to patents . . . .‖) (link).
9
Ariad‘s U.S. Patent No. 6,410,516 entitled ―Nuclear Factors Associated with Transcriptional Regulation‖ includes over 200 claims that broadly cover methods for reducing the activity of the naturally
occurring Nuclear Factor Kappa B (NF-κB) protein. The patent is jointly owned by Harvard College,
Massachusetts Institute of Technology, and the Whitehead Institute, and exclusively licensed by Ariad.
U.S. Patent No. 6,410,516 (filed June 5, 1995) (link).
10
Eli Lilly has a history of involvement in disputes over the written description requirement. It was
the 1997 Federal Circuit decision of Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 119 F.3d 1559, 1569
(Fed. Cir. 1997), that sparked what many have seen as a heightened written description requirement for
biotechnology related inventions (link).
11
Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae on Rehearing en banc in Support of Respondent,
Ariad Pharms., Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 598 F.3d 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (link).
12
Id. at 20.
13
See Oral Argument, Ariad Pharms., Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 598 F.3d 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (argued Dec. 7, 2009), available at http://oralarguments.cafc.uscourts.gov (enter case number 2008-1248;
click audio link for 12-7-2009; oral argument from the United States on the issue runs 23:0029:30)
(link).
14
Id. (Statement by Michel, C.J., as transcribed by the author), available at
http://oralarguments.cafc.uscourts.gov. (enter case number 2008-1248; click audio link for 12-7-2009;
statement from Michel, C.J. at 24:08) (link).
15
This very small number of positive observations suggests that the distribution is well modeled
with the Poisson distribution. Using a Poisson distribution, the 95% confidence interval for expected
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prohibited the USPTO from making new matter rejections would alter the
result in only twenty of the 2,858 cases—about 1% of the cases in my sample.16 These results correspond to the outcomes found by Professor Holman
in his 2007 article, Is Lilly Written Description a Paper Tiger?: A Comprehensive Assessment of the Impact of Eli Lilly and its Progeny in the Courts
and PTO.17 In that article, Holman identified nine examples where original
claims were rejected for lacking written description.18 However, Holman
wrote that each of those rejected claims was, or ―could have easily been,‖
held invalid for lacking enablement.19
In Ariad Pharmaceuticals v. Eli Lilly, the Federal Circuit maintained
the written description doctrine as a separate and distinct requirement.20
The en banc panel based its decision on the text of the Patent Act and its accompanying jurisprudential history, rather than on the policy grounds that
the doctrine plays an important role in policing patent applicant behavior.21
The dissenting-in-part opinion by Judge Linn, joined by Judge Rader, as
well as the concurring opinion of Judge Gajarsa, cite a working version of
this Article in reaching their conclusions that the separate written description requirement is not justified on policy grounds.22 As shown in this essay, the empirical data confirms the court‘s rejection of the doctrine‘s
importance.
This Essay is narrowly written to provide a new set of empirical results
that inform the debate over the importance of the written description in the
context of patent prosecution. The strong conclusion is that, in the context
of patent applications appealed to the BPAI, the impact of the separate written description requirement is negligible apart from its role in policing the
addition of new matter. I posit that this study of BPAI decisions also serves
as a good proxy for the relative proportion of non-appealed cases where the
USPTO depends upon the written description requirement to limit claim
scope. The analysis does, however, have limits. Perhaps most importantly,
I only consider past decisions within a six-month window and thus do not
consider the future effect of a change in the written description requirement
on both applicant and patent office behavior.
These results are important as a direct rebuttal to the USPTO claims of
proportion of affected cases is 0.0%–0.6%.
16
The empirical study has a 95% confidence interval of 0.5%–2.6%.
17
Christopher M. Holman, Is Lilly Written Description a Paper Tiger?: A Comprehensive Assessment of the Impact of Eli Lilly and its Progeny in the Courts and PTO, 17 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 1, 70
(2007).
18
Id.
19
Id. at 71.
20
598 F.3d 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (link).
21
Id. at 134345.
22
Id. at 1372 (Linn, J. & Rader, J., dissenting in part); id. at 1360 (Gajarsa, J., concurring); see also
Anascape, Ltd. v. Nintendo of Am., Inc., No. 2008-1500, 2010 U.S. App. LEXIS 7529, at *2327 (Fed.
Cir. Apr. 13, 2010) (Gajarsa, J., concurring).
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doctrinal importance and as a means to lessen fears that elimination of a
separate written description requirement would have a drastic impact on the
patent prosecution practice.23 More generally, the results prompt a consideration of the ongoing role of niche patent law doctrines.
Part I of this Essay offers a brief discussion of § 112‘s requirements for
written description. Part II examines the Ariad challenge to the written description requirement presented on appeal. Part III explores the USPTO‘s
claimed need for a strong and separate written description requirement to
aid in the patent examination process. Part IV presents the empirical study
and its results. Part V provides a brief set of final remarks and conclusions.
I. THE WRITTEN DESCRIPTION REQUIREMENT OF SECTION 112
The first paragraph of 35 U.S.C. § 112 focuses attention on the amount
of disclosure that a patent applicant must provide in its specification:
The specification shall contain a written description of the
invention, and of the manner and process of making and using it, in such full, clear, concise, and exact terms as to enable any person skilled in the art to which it pertains, or
with which it is most nearly connected, to make and use the
same, and shall set forth the best mode contemplated by the
inventor of carrying out his invention.24
From this paragraph, courts have derived three separate but overlapping doctrines: written description, enablement, and best mode.25 These
doctrines have been amply described by others and, as such, I provide only
as much background here as is necessary for this Essay.26
As it stands, the written description doctrine requires that the patent
specification ―reasonably convey to one of skill in the art that the inventor
possessed the [claimed] subject matter at the time the [patent] application
was filed.‖27 Patent applicants often add or amend claims during prosecution, and the primary historical function of the written description doctrine
23

See Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 42930 (2000) (refusing to overrule Miranda
based largely on the ―persuasive force‖ of stare decisis) (link).
24
35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 1 (2006) (link).
25
See Timothy R. Holbrook, Possession in Patent Law, 59 SMU L. REV. 123 (2006). This Essay
focuses on the enablement and written description doctrines, without regard to the best mode doctrine.
26
See, e.g., DONALD S. CHISUM, CHISUM ON PATENTS § 7 (2009); Jeanne C. Fromer, Patent Disclosure, 94 IOWA L. REV. 539 (2009) (link); Holbrook, supra note 25; Holman, supra note 17; Sean A.
Passino, Amy M. Rocklin & Stephen B. Maebius, Written Description Traps for Antibody Claims, 86 J.
PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC‘Y 317 (2004); Guang Ming Whitley, A Patent Doctrine Without Bounds:
The “Extended” Written Description Requirement, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 617 (2004).
27
Tronzo v. Biomet, Inc., 156 F.3d 1154, 1158 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (considering whether later-claimed
subject matter had been properly disclosed in the parent application) (citation omitted) (link).
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has been to police the addition of ―new matter‖ into the patent claims.28
Section 132 of the Patent Act also provides a prohibition against ―introduc[ing] new matter into the disclosure of the invention.‖29 Because the
claims of a patent are considered part of the disclosure,30 the plain language
of § 132 could also apply to limit changes in claim scope. However, in an
effort to avoid confusion between these two statutory provisions, the predecessor to the Federal Circuit held that the written description requirement of
§ 112 served as ―the proper basis for rejection of a claim amended to recite
elements thought to be without support in the original disclosure‖ and relegated § 132 to the role of policing improper amendments to the specification.31
Originally-filed patent claims are typically self-describing. Patent
claims ordinarily exhibit the requisite evidence of ―possession‖ by simply
spelling out the metes and bounds of the patent right. However, several recent Federal Circuit opinions have held that originally-filed patent claims
also lack sufficient written description if possession of the invention is not
demonstrated.32 This newer wing of the written description requirement is
often termed Lilly Written Description (LWD), as homage to the 1997 Eli
Lilly decision33 that expanded the doctrine.34 Original-claim failings may be
28
See id.; see also In re Rasmussen, 650 F.2d 1212 (C.C.P.A. 1981) (link); Application of Smith,
458 F.2d 1389, 1395 (C.C.P.A. 1972) (a subgenus is not necessarily described by a genus encompassing
it and a species upon which it reads); Application of Lukach, 442 F.2d 967 (C.C.P.A. 1971) (subgenus
range was not supported by generic disclosure and specific example within the subgenus range) (link);
Craig Allen Nard & John F. Duffy, Rethinking Patent Law’s Uniformity Principle, 101 NW. U. L. REV
1619, 1663 (2007) (written description requirement ―has traditionally applied to amendments to claims
made during the prosecution of an application.‖ (citation omitted)) (link).
29
35 U.S.C. § 132 (2006) (link).
30
Application of Gardner, 480 F.2d 879, 879 (C.C.P.A. 1973).
31
In re Rasmussen, 650 F.2d at 1214. This Essay focuses on the role of the written description in
patent office practice. However, it is important to note the open question of whether the new matter restriction of § 132 properly serves as a basis in federal court for an invalidity defense to charges of patent
infringement. See Univ. of Rochester v. G.D. Searle & Co., Inc., 375 F.3d 1303, 130507 (Fed. Cir.
2004) (Lourie, J., concurring) (denying motion for en banc rehearing and noting that the listing of statutory defenses to patent infringement found in 35 U.S.C. § 282 does not include the new matter doctrine
of § 132) (link); Aristocrat Techs. Austl. PTY Ltd. v. Int‘l Game Tech., 543 F.3d 657, 659 (Fed. Cir.
2008) (finding that improper revival is not an available defense) (link); Dennis Crouch, Erroneous Revival by PTO is not a Cognizable Defense in an Infringement Action, PATENTLY-O, Sept. 22, 2008,
http://patentlyo.com/patent/2008/09/erroneous-reviv.html (link).
32
See, e.g., Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 119 F.3d 1559, 156768 (Fed. Cir.
1997) (link); see generally Janice M. Mueller, The Evolving Application of the Written Description Requirement to Biotechnological Inventions, 13 BERKELEY TECH L.J. 615 (1998) (describing the development of the written description requirement); U.S. Patent and Trademark Office, Manual of Patent
Examining Procedure § 2163 (8th ed., July 2008) (―a lack of adequate written description may arise
even for an original claim when an aspect of the claimed invention has not been described with sufficient particularity such that one skilled in the art would recognize that the applicant had possession of
the claimed invention.‖) (link). It is important to remember that the originally-filed claims are themselves part of the original specification. N. Telecom, Inc. v. Datapoint Corp., 908 F.2d 931, 938 (Fed.
Cir. 1990) (link).
33
Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 119 F.3d 1559 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (link).
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found where the invention is claimed and described in a functional form
without identifying underlying structures of operation. Likewise, broad
original claims have been held invalid for failing the written description requirement when the specification did not include detail sufficient to ―convince a person of skill in the art that the inventor possessed the invention.‖35
For instance, the 2005 LizardTech case involved a patent claim directed to a
method of compressing digital images using seamless discrete wave transformation (DWT).36 Although the specification only described one method
for creating a seamless DWT, the claim was not limited to that particular
method.37 The appellate panel in LizardTech held the claim invalid for failing the written description requirement, finding that the specification did
not provide sufficient evidence that the patentee invented the generic method.38
As is common, the LizardTech decision included a parallel finding that
the generic claim was not enabled.39 The enablement doctrine requires that
the original specification of a patent enable one of skill in the art to make
and use the invention.40 Although typically overlapping, the written description and enablement requirements are distinct.41
II. THE ARIAD CHALLENGE TO THE WRITTEN DESCRIPTION
REQUIREMENT
A. Questions on Appeal
In Ariad, an en banc Federal Circuit considered the continued role of
the written description requirement as a doctrine separate and distinct from
enablement. The questions presented read as follows:
1. Whether 35 U.S.C. § 112, paragraph 1, contains a written
description requirement separate from an enablement requirement?
2. If a separate written description requirement is set forth
34

Holman, supra note 17, at 4; see Mueller, supra note 32, at 633 (arguing that written description
as applied to original claims is an inappropriate ―super-enablement‖ requirement).
35
LizardTech, Inc. v. Earth Res. Mapping, Inc., 424 F.3d 1336, 134445 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (link).
36
Id. at 1337.
37
Id. at 134243.
38
Id. at 134546.
39
Id. at 1345. See also Ariad Pharms., Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 560 F.3d 1366, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2009)
(holding that the enablement question was moot because claims were rendered invalid for failing the
written description requirement) (link); Holman, supra note 17, at 78; Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley,
Is Patent Law Technology-Specific?, 17 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1157, 1172 (2002) (link).
40
35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 1 (2006) (link); AK Steel Corp. v. Sollac, 344 F.3d 1234, 1238 (Fed. Cir.
2003) (link); Muniauction, Inc. v. Thomson Corp., 532 F.3d 1318, 1327 n.3 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
41
Univ. of Rochester v. G.D. Searle & Co., Inc., 358 F.3d 916, 921 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (although
―there is often significant overlap,‖ the requirements are distinct) (link).
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in the statute, what is the scope and purpose of the requirement?42
These legal questions had been brewing for years.43
B. Background of the Dispute
The inventors of Ariad‘s asserted U.S. Patent No. 6,410,516 (the ‗516
patent) discovered a transcription factor protein that they named Nuclear
Factor Kappa B (NF-κB).44 The presence of NF-κB within a cell causes the
cell to produce cytokines that are important for a cell‘s immune response.45
The ‗516 patent does not claim invention of the NF-κB protein itself, but rather, the method of reducing a cell‘s response to external influences by reducing the NF-κB binding.46
After an infringement trial, a Massachusetts jury found that two of Lilly‘s products infringed Ariad‘s asserted U.S. Patent No. 6,410,516.47 The
jury also rejected Lilly‘s arguments that the patent was anticipated, that the
patent lacked an enabling disclosure, and that the patent failed the written
description requirement.48 Although Lilly appealed each of these issues, the
Federal Circuit panel focused on the written description requirement, finding Ariad‘s claims invalid for failing to provide a written description of the
invention.49
The heart of the Ariad written description problem centers around the
fact that the ‗516 patent discloses no working or even prophetic examples
of methods that reduce NF-κB activity, and no completed syntheses of any
of the molecules prophesized to be capable of reducing NF-κB activity.
The state of the art at the time of filing was primitive and uncertain, leaving
Ariad with an insufficient supply of prior art knowledge with which to fill
the gaping holes in its disclosure.50
The appellate panel refused to consider the parallel questions of
enablement and anticipation, finding those issues moot based on the written

42

Ariad Pharms., Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 595 F.3d 1329, 1330 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (en banc order)

(link).
43

See Enzo Biochem, Inc. v. Gen-Probe, Inc., 323 F.3d 956, 97075 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (denying en
banc rehearing) (link); Univ. of Rochester v. G.D. Searle & Co., 375 F.3d 1303, 130304 (Fed. Cir.
2004) (denying en banc rehearing) (link); LizardTech, Inc. v. Earth Res. Mapping, 433 F.3d 1373,
137476 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (denying en banc rehearing) (link); Holman, supra note 17.
44
Ariad Pharms., Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 560 F.3d 1366, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (link).
45
Id. at 1370.
46
Id.
47
Id.
48
Id. at 137071.
49
Id. at 137377 (holding that the verdict lacked substantial evidence to support its conclusion).
The court also rejected Lilly‘s inequitable conduct challenge. Id. at 137780.
50
Id. at 1376 (citation omitted).
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description invalidity holding.51 Judge Linn wrote a separate concurring
opinion in which he reiterated his belief that the court‘s ―engrafting of a
separate written description requirement onto section 112, paragraph 1 is
misguided.‖52
The Federal Circuit subsequently granted Ariad‘s motion for an en
banc rehearing of the written description issue.53 Over twenty-five amici
filed briefs, including the U.S. government.54 At the December 7, 2009 oral
arguments, the U.S. government was also granted time to argue its position.55
III. THE USPTO‘S CLAIM OF A NEED FOR THE WRITTEN DESCRIPTION
REQUIREMENT
In its amicus curiae brief, the U.S. government indicated its continued
support for a separate written description requirement as a tool that the
agency uses to eliminate claims during patent prosecutions.56 The government made its position clear: that a separate written description requirement
is ―essential to the operation of the patent system‖;57 plays an ―indispensable role in the administration of the patent system‖;58 is ―fundamental to the
operation of the patent system‖;59 and is ―necessary for USPTO to perform
its examination function.‖60 These conclusions are grounded in the
USPTO‘s ―practical experience‖ in ―appl[ying] the requirements of Section
112, ¶1 to more than 400,000 patent applications each year . . . .‖61 Although the government did not provide any actual examples, it did explain
two situations where the written description requirement becomes important.62 First, the government argues that for claims written in purely func-

51
Id. at 1380 (―Because we hold that claims 80, 95, 144, and 145 of the ′516 patent are invalid for
lack of written description, we need not address infringement or the other validity issues on appeal.‖).
52
Id. (citation omitted) (Linn, J., concurring); see also Univ. of Rochester v. G.D. Searle & Co.,
Inc., 375 F.3d 1303, 132527 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (Linn, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc)
(link); Enzo Biochem, Inc. v. Gen-Probe Inc., 323 F.3d 956, 98789 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (Linn, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc) (link).
53
Ariad Pharms., Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 595 F.3d 1329 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (link).
54
See Briefs for Amici Curiae, Ariad Pharms., Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 598 F.3d 1336 (Fed. Cir.
2010).
55
Oral Argument, Ariad Pharms., Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 598 F.3d 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (argued
Dec. 7, 2009), available at http://oralarguments.cafc.uscourts.gov (enter case number 2008-1248; click
audio link for 12-7-2009) (link).
56
Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae on Rehearing en banc in Support of Respondent,
Ariad Pharms., Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 598 F.3d 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (link).
57
Id. at 19.
58
Id.
59
Id. at 20.
60
Id.
61
Id. at 19.
62
Id. at 2325. Similar arguments are raised in the USPTO‘s Guidelines for Examination of Patent
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tional terms, the USPTO is better able to judge written description than
enablement:
Though such [functional] claims may be enabled, USPTO
is not an experimental laboratory: it lacks both the facilities
and the statutory mandate to determine, through empirical
testing, whether any of millions of prior art inventions may
have exhibited the recited function. By insisting that each
applicant provide a full and exact ―written description of
the invention‖ as part of the specification, Congress protected the ability of USPTO to perform its essential function of distinguishing patentable inventions from the prior
art. Indeed, this is one of the original and enduring purposes of the written description requirement: to ―distinguish
the invention or discovery from other things before known
and used.‖63
The government also argued that the written description requirement is
necessary to police priority claims and ensure that patent applicants do not
improperly add new matter during the prosecution process:
The written-description requirement permits USPTO and
the courts to resolve priority disputes in an expedient and
judicially reviewable fashion by comparing the specifications of the patents or applications in question. Similarly,
―[e]very patent system must have some provision to prevent applicants from using the amendment process to update their disclosures (claims or specifications) during their
pendency before the patent office.‖ Enzo Biochem, Inc. v.
Gen-Probe, Inc., 323 F.3d 956, 977 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (Rader, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing); see 35 U.S.C.
§ 132. ―Adequate description of the invention guards
against the inventor‘s overreaching by insisting that he recount his invention in such detail that his future claims can
be determined to be encompassed within his original creaApplications Under the 35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 1, ―Written Description‖ Requirement, 66 Fed. Reg. 1099
(notice on Jan. 5, 2001) (link). See also Brief of the Washington Legal Foundation as Amicus Curiae in
Support of Defendant-Appellant Supporting Reversal at 22, Ariad Pharms., Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 598
F.3d 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (a purpose of the written description requirement is to ―prevent applicants . .
. from obtaining claims to inventions that they did not invent‖) (link); Brief of the Federal Circuit Bar
Association as Amicus Curiae in Support of Appellant at 2223, Ariad Pharms., Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co.,
598 F.3d 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (―A separate written description requirement is an important tool to
permit the Patent Office and courts to enforce this foundational principle.‖) (link).
63
Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae on Rehearing en banc in Support of Respondent at
21, Ariad Pharms., Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 598 F.3d 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (quoting Act of 1790, ch. 7,
§ 2) (link).
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tion.‖ Vas-Cath Inc. v. Mahurkar, 935 F.2d 1555, 1561
(Fed. Cir. 1991) (citation omitted).64
During oral arguments, the court pressed the government attorney, Mr.
Freeman, for specific evidence supporting the contention that the separate
written description requirement serves a practical purpose. As in its brief,
the government did not point to any evidence supporting the conclusory
statements. The following colloquy at oral arguments between Chief Judge
Michel and Mr. Freeman emphasized this point:
Chief Judge Michel: Why does the patent office care? I
mean, how many applications that can‘t be rejected on other statutory grounds will fail only if we [retain the current
written description requirement]? . . . I‘m asking about impact . . .
Mr. Freeman on Behalf of the Government: I don‘t know
an absolute number, your Honor, but I think that number
must be high . . .
Chief Judge Michel: I can‘t remember ever seeing a patent
office rejection that was based only on the failure of written
description. I‘m not saying there aren‘t any, but the flow of
cases that come through this court at three or four hundred
a year, it‘s exceedingly rare that the patent office hangs its
case on written description. I can‘t remember a single case.
Mr. Freeman: Your Honor, I don‘t have a single case in
mind . . .
Chief Judge Michel: . . . [I]t seems like the practical impact
is miniscule, negligible.
Mr. Freeman: Your Honor, with all respect, one cannot assume away four-hundred thousand applications where the
written description doctrine comes into play in a great
many of them.65

64

Id. at 22.
Oral Argument, Ariad Pharms., Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 598 F.3d 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (argued
Dec. 7, 2009), available at http://oralarguments.cafc.uscourts.gov (enter case number 2008-1248; click
audio link for 12-7-2009; colloquy is from 22:4024:30) (excerpt reproduced as transcribed by the author) (link).
65
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This Essay is directed to the particular questions of Chief Judge Michel—How often does the separate written description requirement actually
make a difference in patent cases? As revealed in Part IV, Chief Judge Michel‘s notional recollections from the bench are far more accurate than the
government‘s contentions.
IV. THE IMPORTANCE OF THE WRITTEN DESCRIPTION REQUIREMENT
IN PATENT PROSECUTION
This study analyzes the comparative impact that a change in the written
description requirement would have had on ex parte BPAI appeals decided
in the first half of 2009. I posit two potential doctrinal changes and their
impact on USPTO practice: (1) elimination of a separate written description
requirement, including elimination of the USPTO‘s ability to reject claims
that include ―new matter‖;66 and (2) elimination of a separate written description requirement, with the exception that the USPTO may still reject
claims for the inclusion of new matter.67
To be clear, Ariad has not argued for complete elimination of the written description requirement. Rather, the petitioner‘s position is that written
description and enablement form a combined resulting doctrine that would
have more power than the current enablement doctrine.68 For this study,
however, we did not consider a strengthened enablement doctrine. Thus,
our results overstate the impact of eliminating a separate written description
requirement, since a strengthened enablement doctrine would limit that impact.
A. Study Design
I broadly searched 2,858 ex parte BPAI decisions that were decided
January through June 2009, and identified 365 decisions that mention ―written description.‖69 Each identified decision was reviewed by hand to deter66

I expect this potential outcome (eliminating the USPTO‘s ability to issue new matter rejections)
to be unlikely for several reasons. Most notably, elimination of the separate written description requirement as a mechanism for policing new matter would abrogate In re Rasmussen, 650 F.2d 1212,
1214 (C.C.P.A. 1976) and, at least, open the door for the USPTO to reject claims under the new matter
prohibitions of 35 U.S.C. § 132. The Rasmussen opinion was premised on the notion that Section 112
includes a written description requirement. See 650 F.2d at 1214. Elimination of the written description
requirement would likewise eliminate the justification for precedential value of Rasmussen. More recent
Federal Circuit case law has already strained the Rasmussen holding by considering claims to be properly rejected under Section 132. In Moba B.V. v. Diamond Automation, Inc, 325 F.3d 1306, 1319 (Fed.
Cir. 2003), for instance, the Federal Circuit explained that, ―a rejection of an amended claim under Section 132 is equivalent to a rejection under Section 112, first paragraph.‖ (citation omitted) (link). Nevertheless, because this point is apparently in serious dispute, I consider it as a potential doctrinal change.
67
Other potential outcomes, such as a strengthening of the written description requirement, were
excluded.
68
Brief for Plaintiffs-Apellees, Ariad Pharms., Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 598 F.3d 1336 (Fed. Cir.
2010).
69
These represented all of the ex parte BPAI decisions available via WestLaw as of February 16,
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mine the particular type of written description rejection at issue and to determine whether a doctrinal change in the written description requirement
would have impacted the outcome of the appeal.70 See Table 1.
Table 1: Doctrinal Change Classification Methodology.
Potential Doctrinal Change
Doctrinal Change 1: elimination of a separate written description
requirement,
including elimination of the
USPTO‘s ability to reject
claims that include ―new matter.‖
Doctrinal Change 2: elimination of a separate written description requirement except
that the USPTO may still reject claims for the inclusion
of new matter.

Classification Methodology
Decisions were classified as being impacted by Doctrinal Change 1 if the decision included a written description
requirement issue that was sustained on
appeal for at least one claim, and no other rejections of that claim were sustained
on appeal.71
Decisions were classified as being impacted by Doctrinal Change 2 if the decision included a written description
requirement issue that was sustained on
appeal for at least one original claim,
and no other rejections of that claim
were sustained on appeal.72

B. Study Outcomes
Written description issues were decided in 123 (4.3%) of the 2,858 decisions.73 A written description requirement rejection was sustained in 50
(1.7%) of the decisions,74 but was outcome-determinative in only 23 (0.8%)
of the decisions.75 All twenty-three of these outcome-determinative deci2010.
70

To be clear, I only considered cases where claims were rejected under the written description requirement. There are two other contexts where written description issues regularly arise. First, written
description is applied in the prior art context to limit the prior art that is asserted. Second, an applicant‘s
attempt to assert rights back to a parent filing, for instance under 35 U.S.C. § 120, is limited by the written description of the parent filing.
71
We coded new reasons for rejection raised by the BPAI as sustained on appeal.
72
For this study, a claim is considered ―original‖ if the claim was included in the original nonprovisional application filing. When the appeal involves a continuation application, a claim is ―original‖
only if the language was found in the original non-provisional parent application. A patent applicant is
allowed to amend claims during prosecution. However, written description requirement rejections of
amended claims are typically treated under the new matter wing of the doctrine. See supra text accompanying notes 2932.
73
As a point of reference, a recent study found that 90% of appeals included at least one obviousness issue that was decided on appeal. Dennis D. Crouch, Understanding the Role of the Board of Patent Appeals: Ex Parte Rejection Rates on Appeal 10 (Univ. of Mo. Sch. of Law Legal Studies Research
Paper No. 2009-16, 2009), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1423922 (link).
74
A rejection was considered sustained if a rejection of at least one claim was sustained.
75
The written description issue was judged outcome-determinative if the decision included a writ-

http://www.law.northwestern.edu/lawreview/colloquy/2010/13/

393

NO RT HW E ST ER N U NI VE RSI T Y LAW RE VIE W C O LLOQ UY

sions involved the rejection of claims that had been added or amended during prosecution and addressed the concern that the added limitations were
not properly described in the original specification. More pointedly, none
of the outcomes of those decisions would have been impacted by a hypothetical change that eliminated the written description requirement, so long
as new matter rejections were still allowed under the same standard available today. These impacts of a doctrinal change in the written description
requirement are shown in Table 2, with a 95% confidence interval (CI) of
the expected proportion of affected cases.76
Table 2: Retrospective Impact of Doctrinal Change on 2009 BPAI Appeal Decisions.

Potential Doctrinal Change
Doctrinal Change 1: elimination of a separate written description requirement including elimination of
the USPTO‘s ability to reject claims that include
new matter.
Doctrinal Change 2: elimination of a separate written description requirement except that the USPTO
may still reject claims for the inclusion of new matter.

Number of
Affected
Cases
23 (0.8%)

0 (0.00%)

95%
CI
0.5%
-1.2%
0.0%
-0.3%

Twelve of the BPAI decisions did involve written description requirement rejections based on originally-filed claim language that could be classified as LWD rejections. However, the written description requirement
was not outcome-determinative in any of these cases because the examiner‘s rejection was either reversed (nine of the cases) or else the claims were
also rejected under another statutory doctrine (three of the cases). The three
decisions where the LWD written description rejection was affirmed all involved inventions related to chemistry77 or biotechnology.78 This is the
same situation discussed in the Federal Circuit case of In re Kubin.79 Table
ten description requirement issue that was sustained on appeal for at least one claim and if no other rejections of that claim were sustained on appeal.
76
The outcomes are modeled with the Poisson distribution.
77
Ex parte Hottovy, No. 2008-4938, 2009 WL 798882 (B.P.A.I. 2009) (polymerization of olefin
monomers in a liquid diluent); Ex parte Harboe, No. 2008-5837, 2009 WL 1683026 (B.P.A.I. 2009) (reducing the glucoamylase activity in a milk clotting composition).
78
Ex parte Carney, No. 2008-4806, 2009 WL 64628 (B.P.A.I. 2009) (stimulating cartilage growth
by administering an agonist of an activated thrombin receptor). In his 2007 study, Holman found nine
BPAI decisions affirming LWD rejectionsall in the area of biotechnology. Holman, supra note 17, at
70.
79
In re Kubin, 561 F.3d 1351, 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (affirming obviousness rejection and not de-
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3 shows written description issues grouped by the USPTO technology center of origin. As shown in the table, the chemistry and biotechnology related technology centers are associated with a greater prevalence of written
description issues.80
However, even in those areas, the outcomedeterminative written description issues were always associated with the
new matter wing of the requirement.
Table 3: 2009 Written Description Appeals Grouped by Technology
Center.

Technology Center
1600 Biotechnology
and
Organic
Chemistry
1700 Chemical and
Materials
Engineering
2100 Computer
- Architecture,
2400 Software,
Security
2600 Communications
2800 Semiconductors,
Electrical and
Optical Systems

Written
Descriptio
BPAI
n
Decisions81 Decisions82
23 (11.4%)
202

Written Description
OutcomeDeterminative
Affected
Affected by
by
Doctrinal Doctrinal
Change I Change II
2 (1.0%)
0 (0.0%)

571

29 (5.1%)

10 (1.8%)

0 (0.0%)

479

16 (3.3%)

3 (0.6%)

0 (0.0%)

249
333

4 (1.6%)
8 (2.4%)

0 (0.0%)
1 (0.3%)

0 (0.0%)
0 (0.0%)

ciding question of written description) (link); see also Ex parte Kubin, 83 U.S.P.Q. 2d (BNA) 1410
(B.P.A.I. 2007) (affirming obviousness and written description rejection but reversing enablement rejection) (link).
80
See Dan L. Burk, Biotechnology in the Federal Circuit: A Clockwork Lemon, 46 ARIZ. L. REV.
441 (2004) (link).
81
The total number of BPAI decisions categorized in this table is slightly less than the 2,858 reviewed decisions because some of the decisions did not indicate a technology center in the header information. If all of the decisions had been properly categorized, the reported percentages would drop
slightly.
82
This refers to the number of BPAI decisions that decided a written description requirement issue.
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Technology Center
3600 Transport,
Construction,
E-Commerce,
Agriculture
3700 Mechanical
Engineering,
Manufacturing
3900 Reexaminations

Written
Descriptio
BPAI
n
Decisions81 Decisions82
18 (3.9%)
467

Written Description
OutcomeDeterminative
Affected
Affected by
by
Doctrinal Doctrinal
Change I Change II
4 (0.9%)
0 (0.0%)

456

21 (4.6%)

1 (0.2%)

0 (0.0%)

39

4 (10.3%)

2 (5.1%)

0 (0.0%)

V. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS
None of the 2,858 BPAI decisions that I analyzed sustained an outcome-determinative written description requirement rejection of originallyfiled claims. This result indicates that Chief Judge Michel‘s perspective is
correct, that—apart from new matter and late-claiming issues—the USPTO
actually relies on the written description requirement to support examiner
rejection in only a miniscule number of cases (at least at the level of appeals).83 Although not an exact reflection, the BPAI appeals numbers likely
serve as a good proxy for the proportion of non-appealed prosecution files
where the USPTO depends upon the written description requirement to limit claim scope.84
This study comes with several important caveats. It does not answer
83
See supra text accompanying note 66, for a discussion of why new matter claim rejections will
still be viable even if the separate written description requirement is eliminated.
84
Although not conclusive, several factors suggest that written description rejections may be appealed at a greater rate than ordinary obviousness rejections. First, an accurate practitioner perception
that BPAI appeals of written description requirement rejections have a higher-than-average reversal rate
could lead to a larger proportion of those types of rejections appealed. Crouch, supra note 73. Second,
the recent tumultuous nature of the written description requirement and the associated uncertainty adds
to the likelihood that a rejection on that issue would be appealed. Finally, written description rejectionsespecially those relating to LWDtend to arise from biotechnology and chemical-related patent
applications. Because patents in those areas tend to be more valuable than average, we would expect a
higher rate of appeal.
As a cross-check, I examined the file histories of a small group of randomly selected and publicly
available patent applications with serial numbers 11/000,000–11/999,999. For each application, I
looked at the most recent final office action (if any) to determine the reasons for rejection. Only one of
the twenty final office actions in my sample included a written description rejection, and that rejection
was based on subject matter that had changed due to an amendment during prosecution.
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any questions about the proper role of the written description requirement
during litigation. Likewise, this study is not intended to either indict or
support the potential use of the written description requirement during patent examination. Rather, the study is directed only toward rebutting the
USPTO‘s statements that the written description requirement is necessary
for the agency to perform its examination function. Based on the results
presented here, it is safe to treat the USPTO‘s statements of the doctrine‘s
importance as incorrect. The Ariad court was correct in its rejection of this
argument.
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